The Washington Post is reporting that some of the Republican dissenters are trying to cut a deal with McCarthy so they get what they want (whatever that is) and he gets the Speakership. This sounds like a promising development for the Republicans but in fact it could make things even more tense in the chamber. Why?
There are 21 Republicans who are opposed to McCarthy and at least one more who said he was now going to vote against him (but let’s ignore him for the moment and stick with 21 – especially since he voted for McCarthy apparently after first saying he would not). Assuming Democrats continue to show up and vote in a united fashion, the only way McCarthy can get elected is if 17 of these 21 Republicans change their vote to him. That’s a tall order when dealing with people who make a fetish out of being unreliable and chaotic. But maybe McCarthy and the dissenters come up with an agreement. Can they keep at least 17 to stick with the deal? What if they can’t? A good way to think about this is by using the analogy of the holdout in eminent domain proceedings.
Eminent domain is the legal process by which the government takes private property for public use. It can be used for single parcels, but it is an effective tool to collect a number of parcels to use for, say, a hospital or train station or freeway. The government offers what it considers just compensation to the property owners and most take it rather than fight it (assuming the process is being exercised legitimately), but some property owners will refuse and fight it in court. These are the holdouts. They demand more money, claiming the government has undervalued their property. In the end, the government may offer them more money or find a way to work around the property. It’s a game of chicken in some way: you might get a lot more money by holding out or you might lose out altogether.
Back to the Speaker election, it only takes five holdouts to prevent McCarthy from getting elected. McCarthy can make promises to the rest of the group that he has to keep in order to secure their votes, but not everyone has to agree. And there is plenty of reason to think five of them won’t agree to anything. Thanks to McCarthy’s behavior after the January 6th coup attempt, no Democrat is willing to help him. That could change if we run into weeks of votes, but I doubt it. Democrats hate McCarthy, and for very good reasons. This gives the holdouts even more leverage. They can stop McCarthy even after he’s given up everything to make a deal with the other 16 dissenters. So, they have an incentive to holdout, and by doing so they may focus more wrath on them from other Republicans, but those Republicans now desperately need them for McCarthy to win.
This raises the prisoner’s dilemma. There are several persons in police custody. The first one that sings gets a deal. The rest get nothing. But if no one talks, they might all walk. If after the deal is concluded with the majority of the Republican dissenters, there remain five holdouts, then who gives in first? The first person who does gets something, maybe a committee chair or a place in leadership. The rest? The enduring hatred of the leader of their party. This will materialize through punishing them somehow, such as stripping them of committee assignments. But, if they all stick together and hold out, McCarthy loses regardless of the deal he made with the other 16.
In the end, it really depends on what these dissenters want. All of them. And you can bet that there are a number of different things these folks want. But some have made it clear the only thing they really want is to stick it to McCarthy. I don’t know what Republicans are talking about tonight, but tomorrow is not likely to go smoothly for them.
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